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  11. Introduction 
 
Although foreign bank penetration has increased in many transitional and emerging 
market countries since the 1990s, like other ASEAN countries, foreign bank entry had 
been strictly regulated in Thailand before the 1997 financial crisis. Since foreign banks 
were not allowed to possess a branch network, they concentrated on wholesale services 
focusing on mother countries’ companies. These restrictions were relaxed under the 
postcrisis financial reforms, and foreign bank penetration then increased substantially. 
Foreign ownership rose significantly in several large domestic banks, and some small 
domestic banks were acquired by foreign banks. Foreign banks have a strong influence 
not only on wholesale market customers but also those in retail markets. They eagerly 
entered the retail markets through participation in majority ownership of domestic banks. 
It is expected that financial deregulation will progress further under the WTO agreements, 
and the presence of foreign financial institutions will continue to rise. This movement is 
expected to be a significant catalyst for change in the domestic banking industry
1. 
The optimal structure of the banking industry and the regulatory constraints that 
would be conducive to such a structure are critically dependent on the technological 
characteristics of the production process. In order to evaluate the impact of foreign 
penetration and to formulate the most appropriate policies to align foreign banks with the 
long-term goals within the Thai banking market, it is essential to investigate the 
differences in production technology between foreign and Thai domestic banks and the 
progressive changes resulting from an upturn in foreign penetration in recent years. In 
practice, the impacts of foreign bank penetration and the suitability of their banking 
policies have remained without scrutiny to date. 
Although the influence of foreign banks has been increasing in Thai banking markets 
since the 1990s, there have been few formal economic studies evaluating the comparative 
performance of foreign and domestic banks in Thailand. The few studies that the authors 
are aware of include Leightner and Lovell (1998), Okuda and Mieno (1999), and 
Intarachote and Brown (2000), who investigated the efficiency and productivity of 
foreign and Thai banks in terms of their progress in financial liberalization in the pre-
Asian crisis period. Montgomery (2003) examined the role of foreign banks in post-crisis 
Asia countries, including Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, focusing particularly 
on the importance of the method of entry. However, there is no econometric analysis in 
his study. 
As far as the authors know, Chantapong (2001, 2003) is the only academic study 
investigating the comparative performance of foreign and domestic banks amid 
deepening foreign penetration after the Asian crisis.
2 There has been no economic study 
investigating the production technology of foreign and Thai domestic banks relating to 
the overall development process of foreign entry before and after the Asian crisis. 
The purpose of this paper is to conduct a microeconomic examination of commercial 
banks in Thailand, focusing on technological features recognized to be vital in evaluating 
increased foreign participation in the banking market. By applying panel data from 27 
commercial banks taken from the period 1990–2002, we estimate the cost functions of 
                                                 
1 See the Financial Sector Master Plan, which was submitted to the Cabinet on January 6, 2004. 
2 Some PhD’ theses conduct econometric exercises examining the cost and profit performances of Thai 
banking markets. See, for instance, Jayapani (1997). 
  2Thai domestic banks, foreign joint venture banks and foreign bank branches, paying 
attention to the impact of financial reform policies. In order to avoid ad hoc empirical 
analysis, we carefully categorize the group of banks and select the variables used in the 
estimated functions based on the framework of microeconomics. First and foremost, this 
paper will undertake a fact-finding to track business operations of Thai domestic and 
foreign banks from the 1990s up to 2002. Specifically, this paper focuses on the 
following three questions. First, did different production technology used by foreign and 
Thai domestic banks impact on their cost performance? Second, if so, what was the 
nature of major differences in production technology between Thai domestic banks and 
foreign bank branches? Third, how did the production technology of domestic venture 
banks change by foreign majority acquisition that was accelerated by financial reforms 
following the Asian financial crisis? Fourth, how did financial reform policies 
strengthening prudential regulations and modernization of the banking industry affect the 
performance of Thai domestic banks and foreign bank branches? Then, based on the 
technological characteristics of the banks identified, we will discuss the appropriateness 
of foreign bank entry policy in Thailand as well as its implications for future banking 
policies. 
This paper consists of five sections. Section 2 briefly reviews related literatures and 
mentions the focuses of our study. Section 3 provides an overview of the development of 
foreign bank entry in the Thai banking market during the period 1990–2002. Section 4 
presents the methodology of regression analysis of the commercial banks’ cost 
performance in Thailand focusing on the impact of foreign participation. Section 5 
discusses the results of the regression analysis, and Section 6 examines the robustness of 
our estimation. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the analysis and refers to the derived 
policy implications. 
According to our empirical analysis, the cost structures of foreign bank branches 
differ from Thai domestic banks, meaning that the technologies describing the production 
process for foreign bank branches are distinct from those of domestic ones. The financial 
reform policies adopted after the Asian crisis increased the operational cost of domestic 
banks, while it reduced that of foreign bank branches. This suggests that strengthening 
prudential regulations and upgrading monitoring systems significantly increases the cost 
of credit risk management in the Thai banking business. On the other hand, new market 
circumstances help foreign bank branches make better use of their advanced skills and 
technology. Among Thai domestic banks, increased foreign ownership affects their cost 
structures. Foreign-acquired banks (i.e., joint venture banks with foreign majority 
ownership) drastically changed their business operations and introduced production 
technology similar to that of foreign bank branches, which helped them decrease costs 
associated with fee-based business and improved cost performance. Like many previous 
studies on emerging market economies
3, this study provides some evidence that recent 
financial reform policies, particularly those allowing greater foreign bank penetration, are 
on the right track to building a desirable banking market in Thailand. 
 
2. Related Studies 
 
2.1 Foreign Banks in Emerging Market Economies 
                                                 
3 Chantapong (2003) on Thailand is included. 
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As foreign bank penetration has increased in transitional and emerging market 
countries since the 1990s, there has been a significant controversy regarding the effects of 
foreign bank entry into their banking markets. Based on their observation of banking 
markets in emerging economies, Pomerleano and Vojta (2001) claim that foreign banks 
have superiority in certain products that require a global platform as well as highly 
qualified human capital and advanced technology. These products include foreign 
exchange and derivatives trading, global underwriting bonds and equities, cross-border 
M&A, trade finance, multiple-currency cash management, global custody, and 
investment management services. The major targeted customers of these products are 
multinational farms and large local farms operating international trade. 
In addition to competitive product advantages, foreign banks have a competitive 
advantage in terms of management processes and the quality of support. They carefully 
plan recruiting, adopt meritocracy, invest in intensive training of human resources, and 
provide high compensation. Foreign banks have demonstrated a competitive advantage in 
loan portfolio management, asset–liability management, and management of information 
services. 
Another important feature of foreign banks is that they are motivated by profit 
seeking and are independent from vested interests based on the coalition with other banks 
exploiting excess profit. On the other hand, existing domestic banks lack effective 
monitoring and use preponderantly relational banking practices. It is expected that the 
increase in foreign penetration weakens the vested interest shared among domestic banks 
and helps promote market competition. 
Foreign banks in emerging economies adopt diversified strategies. Some foreign 
banks develop local franchises that provide services to corporate and retail clients. They 
function within the fabric of the domestic banking market and need a wide branch 
network. By either purchasing existing franchises or growing organically, they expand 
their own franchises.
4 Other foreign banks are narrowing their targeted customer base and 
focusing on selected businesses such as investment banking and private banking activities. 
Their form of entry is determined by the choice of their operational strategy. Some of 
them provide services only to their home-based customers and they are not interested in 
having a large number of branches. 
The new entrance of foreign banks has a special impact on the market environment 
that would not be caused by the entrance of new domestic bank. Different from the 
traditional effects caused by new domestic entrants, foreign entrants help introduce new 
technology and management skills and substantially enhance the market. Facing the new 
foreign entrants, domestic banks are forced to react in an effort to compete against new 
market entrants who are substantially different from the existing domestic banks. In this 
context, in addition to the change in market concentration ratio, the presence of foreign 
market players is significant.  Separated from the impact on the market environment, 
when foreign investors posses the majority share of domestic banks, their business 
performance is expected to change significantly through drastic restructuring and 
                                                 
4 When foreign banks purchase damaged local banks, they, like local domestic banks, have to direct their 
effort into financial restructuring plans to reduce operating costs, cut down bad-debt burdens and sharpen 
competitiveness. 
  4reengineering processes. This is expected to be a significant catalyst for change in the 
domestic banking industry. 
 
2. 2 Empirical Studies on Foreign Bank Performance 
 
A number of empirical studies such as Claessens et al. (2001) have examined the 
effects of foreign bank entry on the banks’ performance in central European and Latin 
American countries where intense foreign bank entry started in the early 1990s.
5 There 
are two ways to evaluate the bank’s operational performance. One is to contrast the 
production technologies within the context of a cost minimization. Another is to employ a 
profit maximization framework. According to these studies, based on micro bank-level 
panel data on financial statements, foreign banks are more efficient and profitable than 
domestic banks. Foreign penetration influenced the positive effects on the recipient 
countries in the sense that they promoted market competition and improved the 
operational efficiency of banking. In addition, foreign banks introduce advanced skills 
and technology helping upgrade the business operations of banks on an overall basis. 
However, despite these positive views concerning foreign bank entry, some studies 
such as Sabi (1996) are more skeptical about its impact on local banking markets. In their 
opinion, foreign banks seem to “cherry pick” the best credits and are uninterested in 
sharing risk management techniques with the local banking industry. Similar 
observations have been found by studies of banking markets in developed economies. 
According to Elyasiani and Rezvanian (2002) concerning the U.S. market, since foreign 
and domestic banks differ in their management strategies, clients, knowledge of the local 
market, international regulatory arbitrage, and international business platform, they have 
different kinds of competitiveness in the banking market and different advantages in 
business operations. The foreign banks’ parent companies’ lack of familiarity with local 
market knowledge and difficulties in applying home country strategies to emerging 
market economies hinder their efforts to penetrate markets and earn profits. Therefore, 
foreign and domestic banks are likely to share different market roles rather than 
intensively competing with each other. As pointed out by Sabi (1996), foreign banks are 
hesitant to expose themselves to greater liquidity and so the actual influence of foreign 
entry on domestic banks is relatively limited. 
Comparative performance of domestic and foreign banks has been studied in 
developed countries especially in the U.S. where foreign bank presence has increased 
significantly since the 1980s. The competitive advantage of the foreign banks was first 
investigated by Goldberg (1992). Following this pioneering study, a large number of 
studies including Meinster and Elyasiani (1988), Mahajan et al. (1996), DeYoung and 
Nolle (1996), Elyasiani and Mehdian (1995), Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996) have 
deepened the analysis. All of these studies use formal econometric analysis based on a 
                                                 
5 They include Barajas et al. (2000), Claessens, S. and Jansen, M. (2000), Bhattacharaya et al. (1997), 
Clarke et al. (2001), Claessens et al. (2001), Denizer, C. (2000), Levine (1996), and Litan et al. (2001). 
These studies can be classified into two groups: studies examining the effects across countries, and studies 
focusing on the effects of foreign bank entry for a particular country. These studies evaluate cost efficiency 
by using simple regression of the cost function such as C = C (Yj；Pk；FOR；BSD；MACRO). The 
independent variables contain a set of foreign bank indicators FOR and other control variables that are 
necessary to explain the affect on bank performance. They include a vector of banking sector structure 
variables BSD such as market concentration ratio, and a vector of macroeconomic variables MACRO. 
  5rigorous theoretical background of microeconomics. These studies observed that cost 
structure and performances differ between domestic and foreign banks since they differ in 
management strategies, clients, knowledge of the local market, international regulatory 
arbitrage, and international business platforms. 
 
2.3 Focuses of our Study 
 
This paper focuses on the following three respects that are recognized to be vital for 
investigating the effects of increased foreign bank entry on the Thai banking industry and 
identifying the sources of operational advantages of foreign and domestic banks. 
First, we investigate the technological differences between foreign bank branches and 
Thai domestic banks. Wholly foreign owned banks were not allowed to have a branch 
network in Thailand and, as a result, their business operations focused on the wholesale 
markets, in particular foreign companies operating in Thailand. By contrast, Thai 
domestic banks have at least 50–60 branches and operate in both retail and wholesale 
markets. Since these two possess widely diversified operational characteristics, they may 
operate using different technology. These wholly foreign owned banks focus on 
specialized customers such as multinational corporations and large domestic corporations. 
They have competitive advantage in a class of products based on highly skilled human 
capital and a worldwide platform both of which are expensive to maintain. As a result, 
their products are human capital as well as physical capital intensive and their fixed cost 
of operations is higher than others. This hypothesis is supported by the observation that 
the cost function of foreign bank branches is distinctively different from those of Thai 
domestic banks. 
Secondly, we clarify whether the production technology of foreign and Thai domestic 
banks changed as Thai government imposed more stringent prudential regulations on 
banking activities and strengthened information disclosure on corporate sectors in the 
postcrisis financial reforms. While the Thai economy enjoyed high economic growth and 
the banking sector was flourishing before the Asian crisis, banking business activities 
lacked prudence. The reform policies adopted after the crisis improved the transparency 
of information and upgraded the legal and accounting systems, which were expected to 
contribute to modernization of banking business and increase the operational efficiency 
of banks. The hypothesis is supported by the observation that the change in market 
circumstances caused by postcrisis financial reform has significant relation to the 
performance of Thai domestic and foreign banks. 
Thirdly, we examine the differences in technology between the Thai domestic banks 
and the foreign majority acquired banks that emerged in the financial reforms following 
Asian crisis.6 As described in Section 3, the entry of foreign banks has progressively 
increased through two stages since the late 1980s. While financial regulations on foreign 
capital flows were relaxed at the beginning of the 1990s, the number of foreign bank 
branches was strictly limited and they had to focus on the wholesale business. It was only 
after the Asian crisis that foreign banks were allowed to expand their branch networks 
and participate in the retail market. When foreign investors possess the majority share of 
domestic banks, their business performance is likely to change significantly through 
                                                 
6 These are defined as banks with more than 50% of their shares held by foreign investors. 
  6drastic restructuring and reengineering processes7. This is expected to be a significant 
catalyst for change in the domestic banking industry. The hypothesis is supported by the 
observation that the degree of foreign ownership significantly relates to the performance 
of banks. When foreign ownership is measured as its percentage of total shareholders, it 
is expected that majority foreign ownership contributes to a change in the bank 




3. Development of Foreign Bank Entry in the Thai Market 
 
3.1 Development of Foreign Bank Entry 
 
Before conducting estimation analysis of the Thai domestic banking market in the 
next section, we provide a simple overview of the main features of the changes in the 
Thai banking market from the beginning of the 1990s until 2002. 
The Thai financial system changed considerably after the financial liberalization in 
the beginning of the 1990s. This comprised the following deregulation. In 1990, Thailand 
had accepted the IMF’s Article VIII and ended foreign exchange controls on current 
account transactions. Then in 1991, most restrictions on capital account transactions were 
abandoned. In 1993, aiming to facilitate international borrowings and to encourage fund 
inflows, Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBF) was established. In 1994, 
regulations on outward direct investment, travel expenditures and additional channels of 
cross-border payments were relaxed. Along with these reforms, deregulation measures 
took place in Thai banking markets. Commercial banks were permitted to undertake new 
business and finance and securities companies were allowed to have new lines of 
operations. These reforms were pursued under the presumption that financial 
liberalization would promote market competition and enhance the Thai financial market. 
However, new-entry foreign banks still do not play a major role in the financial 
market relative to domestic banks. Although BIBF led to a greater entry of new 
participants from abroad, they were not allowed to undertake the full range of financial 
services. The amount of lending extended from BIBF and branches of foreign banks 
expanded drastically and a huge amount of foreign capital flowed into the Thai economy. 
Market competition between Thai commercial banks and other nonbank financial 
institutions intensified with the liberalization measures. However, foreign penetration in 
the Thai banking market was limited and foreign banks were in effect segmented from 
other Thai domestic banks. 
A significant change in the Thai financial market took place again as part of the 
financial restructuring program in the aftermath of financial crisis in 1997. One such 
change was the relaxation of the regulation on foreign shareholding limit in Thai 
                                                 
7 According to the Stock Exchange of Thailand (1997), to have a controlling power over a company, the 
Thai corporate charter provision requires at least 25% of a company’s outstanding shares. Therefore, even 
though banks are not majority held by foreign investors, if the ownership structure is widely diversified, the 
increase in foreign ownership will have substantial impact on domestic bank performance. However, since 
the ownership structure of Thai domestic banks was highly concentrated, foreign ownership of more than 
50% was essential to control the acquired banks. 
  7commercial banks. Thai authorities permitted foreign investors to hold more than 49% of 
the share in Thai banking markets for up to 10 years compared to the 25% foreign 
shareholding limit before the crisis. 
As a result, family ownership in Thai banks, which used to dominate Thai banks, has 
significantly declined while the share of foreign ownership in domestic commercial 
banks has gradually increased. Four commercial banks were majority (owning more than 
50% of total shares) held by foreign investors in 2002
8. The rise in foreign ownership is 
expected to cause a greater degree of competition and affect domestic banks’ 
performance, either positively or negatively. 
An acquisition of four domestic banks by the foreign partners after the crisis is said to 
be the important catalyst for change in Thai domestic banking sector. Foreign-acquired 
banks have brought about new and advanced technologies and skills, which resulted in 
greater cost efficiency. New technology connected and centralized databases across the 
bank, allowing for more efficient internal communication and eventually delivery of 
consumer products (Crispin et al., 2000).  
To compensate for the slow growth of loan demand and non-performing loans 
problems following the crisis, banks have placed more importance on fee-based services 
such as investment banking and mortgages. As foreign partners have specialized skills in 
consumer-banking businesses, foreign-affiliated banks are likely to have competitive 
advantages over other domestic banks. 
Meanwhile, foreign-affiliated banks have placed heavy emphasis on reducing 
operating expenses, including decreasing branch networks, laying-off redundant staff, 
and adopting early retirement programs. On the other hand, a need to invest in new 
technology, to modernize their business and management practices can cause the higher 
operation costs. This may be reflected in the higher service fees. Customers are, however, 
expected to receive more advantages from a wide variety of services in the long run 
(Montreevat, 1999)  
Regarding the lending practices, credit extension tasks were moved from branches to 
central headquarters. One reason is that branch staff could concentrate more on selling 
and service (Crispin et al., 2000). Another possible reason is that banks have tried to 
create lending standards to avoid the connected lending that tends to occur when branch 
staff and customers are acquainted. Loan approval practices, previously based on 
collateral or relationships between lenders and borrowers, have become cash flow-based, 
which should better reflect the borrower’s real financial conditions and the ability to 
repay loans.  
Significant changes in banking services and management have occurred, not only in 
banks that have taken on foreign partners, but also in the remaining domestic banks. To 
maintain their competitiveness and market shares in the new market environment, 
domestic banks have introduced new financial products and services, concentrating more 
on consumer and retail markets. The domestic banks have launched Internet-based 
banking services and provided consumer-based financial services such as asset 
management and mortgage lending.  
 
3.2 Data for the Thai Banking Industry 
                                                 
8 UOB Radanasin Bank, Bank of Asia (ABN AMRO), Standard Chartered Nakornthon Bank, The DBS 
Thai Danu Bank. 
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Using panel data on 28 domestic commercial banks over the period of 1990–2002, we 
describe below some key banking sector indicators in order to examine descriptively the 
effects of foreign bank presence on domestic bank performance. The names of banks are 
in Table A1 in the appendix. Table 1 describes how foreign participation evolves in Thai 
domestic banks. Defining foreign majority owned banks as those in which foreign 
investors own more than 50% of the total equity, all banks were domestically owned 
before the financial crisis in 1997. After the crisis, eleven banks out of fifteen banks 
remained domestically owned and the other four banks were acquired by foreign 
investors under the financial restructuring reforms resulting from the crisis. In this sense, 
given the legal restrictions in place before the crisis, foreign entry occurred only after 
1998. Both market share and the number of foreign majority owned banks jumped just 
after the crisis. However, foreign investors owned equities of some domestic banks even 
before the financial crisis and foreign participation in some domestic banks increased 
substantially after the crisis. 
 
Table 1 Evolution of Foreign Participation 
 
Table 2 presents statistics for the principle variables, comparing between foreign 
bank branches and Thai domestic banks during the period 1990–2002. The data highlight 
the following points. First, the ratio of interest income to total incomes for foreign banks 
is lower than domestic banks. This suggests that foreign banks are likely to focus on the 
fee-based business while domestic banks rather concentrate on the tradition-banking 
business (i.e. deposit–loan allocation). However, due to bad loan problems, stricter 
regulation, and a decrease in loan demand in the aftermath of crisis domestic banks also 
try to seek for new sources of incomes such as investment banking to compensate for the 
decline in interest income. 
 
Table 2 Operational Behaviors of Foreign and Domestic Banks 
 
When we look at the movement of factor prices, that is the price of raised funds, wage 
rate and rental cost, some differences between foreign bank branches and Thai domestic 
banks are evident. Compared with domestic banks, foreign banks tended to have lower 
costs of funding particularly in the precrisis period. The possible explanation is that the 
main source of funds for foreign banks comes from its headquarters abroad, which is 
cheaper than domestic funding. However, the differences on the costs of funds between 
the two groups are smaller after the Asian crisis. 
As for wage rates, we find higher rates for foreign bank branches relative to domestic 
ones. Foreign banks pay higher average wages for their highly skilled labor for their 
advanced technique and knowledge. On the other hand, as Thai domestic banks in 
general focus on the basic deposit–lending services they do not need much higher-skilled 
labor. As the result, domestic banks have lower wage rates. 
In addition, we find higher costs of equipment renting for foreign bank branches than 
Thai domestic banks. The result implies that foreign bank branches are prone to invest in 
higher technology and new equipment, thus face higher such costs than Thai domestic 
banks. 
  9The ratio of total cost to total income is a measure of bank operating efficiency. We 
found that foreign bank branches particularly in the crisis period show the lower ratio, 
implying their higher operating efficiency compared with domestic banks. Regarding the 
composition of total costs, interest expenses have the largest share in both domestic and 
foreign bank branches. Nevertheless, we find a higher proportion of interest expense for 
the former. Consistent with the above explanation, foreign banks show a higher fraction 
of personnel expenses than do domestic banks. 
 
 
4. Methodology of Estimation 
 
4.1 Choice of Output and Input 
 
While there is no clear agreement on how to identify bank outputs and their factor 
inputs, generally there are two different approaches: the production approach and the 
intermediation approach. The production approach recognizes banks as institutions that 
produce financial services such as loans, deposits and investments in securities businesses 
using factor inputs such as labor and capital. The intermediation approach views banks as 
institutions that absorb funds from the public to relend them. According to this approach, 
loans are outputs and deposits are inputs. 
In this paper, following intermediation approach, we recognize that banks combine 
acquired funds X1, labor X2 and physical capital X 3 as inputs to produce two different 
types of financial services as output. One is the services provided through traditional 
bank loan business Y1 and the other is those provided through other businesses, including 
investments in securities and so-called fee-based business Y2. Three inputs are measured 
by the Baht value of borrowed funds, the number of employees, and the Baht value of 
fixed assets and premises of the bank. The financial services produced by banks are 
measured by “income,” which equals the market value of these services. Although the 
physical amounts of financial services are not measurable, if the unit prices of these 
services are assumed to be constant, the “incomes” correspond to the quantitative indices 
based on the Division index. Therefore, we assume that Y1 is measured by the interest 
income from loans and deposits, while Y2 is measured by the total noninterest income, i.e. 
current income minus interest income. 
If bank production function F (Y1, Y2；Q1, Q2, Q3) = 0 has a strictly convex structure, 
a unique multiproduct joint cost function C = C (Y1, Y2, P1, P2, P3) can be constructed. 
Here, average wages P1, rental rate of physical capital P2, and the average interest rate on 
borrowed funds P3 are used as input prices. Thus, P1 X1, P2 X2, and P3 X3 are expenses for 
acquiring funds, workers and physical capital, respectively, each roughly corresponding 
to the total interest expense, payroll expense and equipment expenses. Cost function C is 
degree one homogenous, nondecreasing and concave in input prices. Due to duality 
between the production function F and cost function C, the two functions contain the 
same information about bank production technology. 
 
4.2 Estimated Cost Function 
 
In order to handle the problem of small samples, we compiled cross-sectional data 
  10covering the observed period so as to estimate the cost function of commercial banks in 
Thailand using panel data
9. The estimation method, in principle, is similar to Elyasiani 
and Rezvanian (2002)
10. Each parameter includes a dummy shift variable taking into the 
account whose parameters can differ between banks with branch networks and pure 
foreign banks without branch network. 
The t-th (t = 1,2,･･･, 13) period cost function for the i-th (i = 1,2,･･･, 27) bank is 
assumed to be represented by the trans-log cost function with three factors and two 
products (1). By normalizing the values of all variables around the mean values, the 
trans-log cost function can be recognized as a second order approximation of the cost 
function based on the mean values. The  it ν are random errors, assumed to be i.i.d. 
(Independent And Identically Distributed) and have  ( )
2 σ , 0 N -distribution, independent 
of all explanatory variables. 
In order to examine if production technologies differ among different groups of banks, 
two dummy variables, DF and DH are included in equation (1) which represent respective 
bank characteristics of foreign bank branches and foreign majority acquired banks, i.e., 
joint banks with foreign ownership of more than 50%; DF = binary value equal to 1 if 
foreign bank branches, 0 if other banks, and DH = binary value equal to 1 if foreign 
majority acquired banks, 0 if other banks. 
Dummy variables are added to equation (1) in the two different forms, i.e. as intercept 
dummies and slope dummies
11. For example, since in the equation (1) the constant term 
0 α measures the intercept for Thai domestic banks, the constant term plus φ  measures 
the intercept for foreign bank branches. The coefficients of slope dummy variables also 
indicate that the cost function for the different group of banks differ in the slope 
coefficients. For example, in equation (1) the coefficient  j α  measure the parameter of 
variable   for Thai domestic banks, while the coefficient  jit Y ln j α plus the coefficient  Yj φ  
measures the coefficient of variable ln  for foreign bank branches.  jit Y
In addition, we control other factors that may have effects on bank performance, that 
is, the effects of macro economic variables and the impact of financial reform policies. 
Macroeconomic circumstances is assessed in terms of the time dummy variables T  for 
each period t (t = 1,2,･･･,12). The impact of the stringent financial reforms taken by Thai 
government after the Asian crisis is controlled by the financial reform policy dummy; 
POLICY =  binary value equal to 1 in the period of 1998–2002, 0 otherwise. 
t
Four domestic banks were acquired by foreign investors as part of the financial 
rehabilitation process undertaken by the Thai authorities after the Asian crisis. Since 
these acquired banks were severely damaged by the crisis, the Thai government promoted 
the rehabilitation of these banks in order to encourage foreign acquisition of them
12. A 
                                                 
9 One other way to handle the data limitations is to reduce the number of explanatory variables matching to 
the level of number of data to satisfy a certain degree of freedom. 
10 Okuda and Hashimoto (2004) adopt a similar methodology in their study on the Malaysian banking 
industry. 
11 As Maddala (1988) explains, an intercept dummy indicates that the cost function for the different group 
of banks differs in the intercept term. The coefficient of the dummy variables measures the differences in 
the fixed cost between different groups of banks. 
12 They are sometimes called hybrid banks in the Thai business world. 
  11substantial amount of bad loans was written off and transferred to the asset management 
accounts managed by the Thai government  Moreover, after the acquisition, foreign 
investors conducted intensive rehabilitation as well as restructuring activities at 
substantial cost.  They changed business strategies drastically and modernized their 
business behavior. In order to grasp these special activities of the foreign majority 
acquired banks, the restructuring activities dummy is added to the estimated function for 
foreign-acquired banks, which is the decreasing time trend variable, RESTRA = 3 in 1999, 
2 in 2000, and 1 in 2001. 
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In order for this cost function to be meaningful in an economic sense, the following 
four constraints should be met: symmetry between cross partial derivatives (2a), 
monotony of products and factor prices (2b), homogeneity of degree one in factor prices 
(2c), and weak concavity in factor prices, satisfied by (2d). Furthermore, to ensure a 
sufficient degree of freedom in estimation as well as to simplify the estimation work as in 
Rezvanian (2002). it is also assumed that the cost function (1) is separable between factor 
prices and products (2e). 
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For statistical estimation, we consider the asset gap among commercial banks, and 
use the estimator of White (1980) by which we can obtain a robust estimator even in a 
case where heteroscedasticity exists and its form is unknown. Equation (1) is estimated 
with constraints using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) with cost share functions
13. 
In the actual estimation process, equation (1) is first estimated given constraints (2a), (2c), 
(2d), and (2e), then the consistency of the estimated parameters with constraint (2b) is 
checked. 
 
4.3 Economies of Scale and Scope, Technological Difference 
The trans-log cost function (1) has a general form in that the restrictions of economies 
of scale and economies of scope
14. These restrictions will be statistically tested in the 
process of estimation of the cost function. The following hypotheses concerned with 
production technology will be tested. 
First, economies of scale will be tested. The total elasticity of scale on overall 
production at time t  is represented by equation (3) for cost function 
. Economies of scale which do not depend on time 
passing exist if the value of 
















 is strictly less than unity, and vice versa. 
Economies of scale will be tested using the maximum likelihood test for the hypothesis 






















F it it Y it Y it Y Y Y
H it it Y it Y it Y Y Y





D Y Y Y Y
D Y Y Y Y





} ) ln (ln ln ln ) {(
} ) ln (ln ln ln ) {(





2 1 12 2 22 1 11 2 1
2 1 12 2 22 1 11 2 1
2 1 12 2 22 1 11 2 1
2 1
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + +






φ φ φ φ φ
ς ς ς ς ς
α α α α α
   (3) 
 
 
Second, economies of scope will be tested. Economies of scope exist if the following 
scope equivalency holds. In other words, if the value of equation (4) is strictly less than 
zero, then economies of scope exist. The actual estimation is conducted in the proximity 
of the mean values. Economies of scope will be tested using the maximum likelihood test 
                                                 
13 Cost share functions are derived by Shepherd’s Lemma under perfect competition. It is represented as 
follows in the case of our augmented trans-log cost functions. 
) 3 2 1 ( ln ln
ln
ln









jt jt = + + =
∂
∂
= γ β β
 
14 “Economies of scale” and “economies of scope” are presumed to exist inherently in the banking industry 
characterized by large fixed costs and common factors of production. See Leyland and Pyle (1977). 
Promotion of these economies and technical progress was generally recognized to be an important policy 
objective in the Philippine financial reforms. 
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In examining the estimation results, the technological differences between foreign 
bank branches and domestic banks are assessed using the coefficient values of the foreign 
bank branch dummy variable D F. The effects of foreign majority ownership on cost 
performance of domestic banks are assessed by using the coefficient values of foreign-
acquired bank dummy variable DH. 
 
4.4 Data Used and Variables 
 
The sample data include unbalanced panel data of 27 banks in Thailand. Out of 28 
banks, 17 banks are the Thai domestic and hybrid banks and the remaining 11 banks are 
purely foreign owned banks (i.e., foreign bank branches). The data set covers the 13-year 
period from 1990 through 2002. Our sample period covers the 1990s’ financial 
liberalization as well as the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which are believed to be a 
significant drive of the changes in the Thai banking system. Balance sheet and income 
statement information are obtained from the I-SIMS database of the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand. We acquired data for the number of employees from “The Commercial Banks 
in Thailand”, the report annually issued by Bangkok Bank. The values of individual 
variables used in the estimation are calculated as follows. All variables are normalized by 
the GDP deflator. 
 
Y1 = (Interest income) 
Y2 = (Noninterest income) 
P1 = (Interest expense) / (Total liabilities) 
P2 = (Personnel cost) / (Number of staff) 
P3 = {(Rental of premises) + (Rental of leasehold) + (Equipment hire)} / (Fixed 
assets) 
C = (Total interest expenses) + (Payroll expenses) + (Rental of premises) + (Rental 
of leasehold) + (Equipment hire) 
 
In order for our analysis to be credible, it is more appropriate to select a data set that 
covers only large and medium sized banks and is available continuously over the sample 
period. The operational patterns of these banks are more stable and established. In 
estimating the cost function using the SUR method, the annual panel data from 1990 to 
2002 for 27 banks are used. The other banks are excluded from the estimation, since no 
data were available spanning the entire observation period. 
  14Foreign ownership is measured as the percentage of total foreign shareholders 
holding more than 5% of the total bank stock. In 2002, four out of 15 commercial banks 
were majority (more than 50% of total share) held by foreign investors. Even though the 
common stock of the rest of the domestic banks is not completely owned by foreign 
banks, the proportion of foreign ownership considerably increased especially in the 
aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis. The rise in foreign ownership is expected to impact 




                                                
5. Estimation Results 
 
Production Technology of the Thai Domestic Banks 
The results of the estimation using the cost function and two cost share functions for 
the sample of domestic and foreign banks during the period 1991–2002 are summarized 
in Table 3. The estimation method is the SUR (seemingly unrelated regression) method. 
Most of the coefficient estimators are statistically significant and follow their expected 
signs. The adjusted R-square is high. Overall, we obtain satisfactory results for the cost 
function estimation. 
 
Table 3 Results of Estimation 
 
The estimation results indicate the existence of economies of scale for Thai domestic 
banks, but economies of scope were not observed. Regarding economies of scale in the 
large-sized bank group, the value of conditioning formula (3) was 0.861, which meets the 
condition of economies of scale. The result of the Wald test, which examines whether 
conditioning formula (3) is equal to unity, had a high statistical significance of 34.349 (P-
value = 0.00), indicating clear economies of scale for these banks. On the other hand, 
regarding economies of scope, the value of conditioning formula (4) was 0.144, which 
contradicts the condition of economies of scope. The result of the Wald test was 24.055 
(P-value = 0.00), which examines if conditioning formula (4) is equal to zero, a high 
statistical significance, indicating diseconomies of scope. 
 
Production technology of foreign bank branches 
The foreign bank branch dummy DF is included in the regression equation to examine 
whether there is a difference in cost efficiency between domestic banks and foreign banks. 
Regarding the parameters of dummy variable DF, which indicate the characteristics of 
banks, the t  values  of them were large and had a high statistical significance. This 
indicates that there is a clear difference in the production technology between foreign 
banks and the other banks. 
While we found a negative coefficient for the foreign bank branch dummy, which 
indicates the lower fixed cost for foreign banks relative to domestic banks, its statistical 
significance is low. Foreign banks focus on specialized customers and their operational 
size is smaller than domestic banks. This implies that the fixed cost of foreign bank 
 
15 To have a controlling power over a company, the Thai corporate charter requires at least 25% of a 
company’s outstanding shares (Stock Exchange of Thailand, 1997). However, a shareholder with at least 
20% of a company’s shares has an effective control shareholding. 
  15branches is smaller than that of their rivals. However, foreign banks need advanced 
technologies and equipment to provide new services to their customers while domestic 
banks mainly focus on their traditional banking business, thereby there is less 
requirement for them to have a high level of technology and equipment. This second 
factor tends to increase the fixed cost of foreign bank branches over that of their domestic 
rivals. The first and second factors have contrary effects on the fixed cost. 
If we examine the components of cost structures in detail, the coefficient of DF lnY1t 
and DF lnY2t are not statistically significant. This suggests that there is no significant 
difference either in the lending businesses or the fee-based business between domestic 
banks and foreign banks. 
In the foreign bank branches, similarly to domestic banks, economies of scale were 
observed, while economies of scope were not observed. Regarding economies of scale in 
foreign bank branches, the value of conditioning formula (3) was 0.864, which meets the 
condition of economies of scale. The result of the Wald test had a high statistical 
significance of 3.543 (P-value = 0.069), indicating economies of scale for foreign bank 
branches. Regarding economies of scope, the value of conditioning formula (4) was 
0.169 and the Wald statistics was 38.960 (P-value = 0.000). This result indicates that 
there were diseconomies of scope with a high statistical significance in foreign bank 
branches. 
We found positive signs for the coefficients of the interaction term between foreign 
bank branch dummy DF and prices of labor and physical capital P2  and  P3, which 
indicates that the production cost of foreign bank branches is more elastic to the change 
in wages and rental rates than the production cost of Thai domestic banks. Our findings 
also suggest that the operational cost of foreign banks is less elastic to the change in 
borrowing interest rate P1 compared to that of local banks. These differences in elasticity 
between foreign bank branches and Thai domestic banks reflect the differences in the 
details of services provided between the two groups
16. Highly skilled labor and capital 
equipment are used more intensively in the production process of foreign bank branches, 
while funds are more intensively used in the production process of domestic and hybrid 
banks. Therefore, when wages or rental rates go up, the production cost will rise higher 
for foreign bank branches than for Thai domestic banks. 
 
The effects of changes in market environments after the crisis 
The financial reform policy dummy POLICY is included to grasp the effects of the 
changes in market environment in the postcrisis period. We obtained a significantly 
positive coefficient for the financial reform policy dummy for domestic banks. Thai 
domestic banks have tried to restructure their business operations and reduced 
unnecessary expenses, such as laying off employees and closing a number of branches. 
However, they, at the same time, were forced to expand their spending by investing in 
advanced technologies and equipment to compete in the more competitive market as well 
as to improve the operating efficiency in the long run. Moreover, banks faced an excess 
amount of liquidity due to the influx of deposits from the closure of finance companies. 
Simultaneously, banks found it difficult to extend loans due to the remaining large 
                                                 
16 This is an analogy of the Stolper–Samuelson effect in international economics. The rise in relative price 
of a commodity corresponds to the rise in the price of the factor that is used intensively in the production 
process of that commodity. 
  16amount of nonperforming loans and the unrecovered loan demand from firms. An 
increase in deposits could cause a large interest burden for banks. An increase in costs is 
likely to outperform a decrease in costs. Thus, we find a rise in costs for domestic banks 
following the financial reforms taken after crisis. 
Contrary to that of Thai domestic banks, the estimated parameter of the financial 
reform policy dummy for foreign bank branches was negative and statistically significant. 
This suggests that operational costs of foreign bank branches were reduced under the new 
market circumstances that emerged after the Asian financial crisis. The strengthening of 
information disclosure of the corporate sector, improvement of accounting system, and 
upgrading of the legal system contributed to reducing their operational costs.
17 These 
reforms improved the transparency of information and lessened the disadvantage in 
information production that foreign bank branches suffered. These reforms created 
circumstances in which foreign bank branches could make effective use of their advanced 
financial skills and enhance their cost efficiency substantially. 
 
Production technology of the foreign-acquired banks 
Next, we consider the effect of foreign majority ownership, i.e. the foreign-acquired 
bank dummy, DH on cost performance. The estimated results show a difference in terms 
of production technology between domestic banks and hybrid banks with more than 50% 
of foreign participation. The results indicate that the acquisition of domestic banks by 
foreign banks gives rise to significant change in their operation in only a few years. 
First, similar to foreign bank branches, we found positive signs for the coefficients of 
the interaction term between foreign-acquired bank dummy variable DH and the prices of 
labor and physical capital P2  and P3. That indicates that the production cost of joint 
venture banks is more elastic to the change in wages and rental rates than the production 
cost of Thai domestic banks. Our finding also suggests that the operational cost of 
foreign-acquired banks is less elastic to the change in borrowing interest rate P1 
compared with that of Thai domestic banks. These differences in elasticity between 
foreign-acquired banks and Thai domestic banks reflect the differences in the details of 
services provided between the two groups. Highly skilled labor and capital equipment are 
used more intensively in the production process of foreign-acquired banks, while funds 
are more intensively used in the production process of domestic banks. Therefore, when 
wages or rental rates go up, the production cost becomes higher for foreign-acquired 
banks than for other domestic rivals. 
Second, whereas the interaction term between the foreign-acquired bank dummy DH 
and interest income Y1it is not statistically significant
18, the coefficient of the interaction 
term between the foreign-acquired bank dummy DH and noninterest income Y2 it is 
statistically significant and negative.  Banks with a majority percentage of foreign 
                                                 
17 Firms are required to prepare their financial statements in conformance with accounting standards issued 
by the Ministry of Commerce under the new Accounting Act of B.E. 2543 (2000). Importantly, the Act 
imposes penalties on companies that do not comply with the prescribed standards. For companies listed on 
the Stock Exchange of Thailand, an additional penalty may be imposed by the Securities and Exchange Act. 
18 The interaction term between DH and Y1is positive. The hybrid banks with majority foreign ownership 
seem to face a higher cost in lending than Thai domestic banks. In order to expand lending to new 
customers, banks with large foreign participation have higher cost in collecting information and monitoring. 
In addition, they tend to be stricter in managing the lending process. Thus, lending expenses are likely to be 
greater for banks with high foreign partner participation.  
  17ownership have lower costs in fee-based businesses. Compared to Thai domestic banks 
whose main income derives from traditional loan businesses, banks with foreign majority 
participation are more specialized and apply more effort into fee-based business such as 
investment banking. As a result, they can provide customers with services more 
efficiently. 
Thirdly, compared to either Thai domestic banks or foreign bank branches, foreign-
acquired banks possessed greater economies of scale. Regarding economies of scale in 
foreign-acquired banks, the value of conditioning formula (3) was 0.676, which meets the 
condition of economies of scale. The result of the Wald test had a high statistical 
significance of 7.219 (P-value = 0.007), indicating economies of scale for foreign-
acquired banks. Regarding economies of scope, the value of conditioning formula (4) was 
–0.335 and the Wald statistics was 2.884 (P-value = 0.089). Statistically significant 
economies of scope were observed in foreign-acquired banks, whereas such economies 
were not observed in either Thai domestic banks or foreign bank branches. 
Our findings imply that foreign-acquired banks drastically changed their business 
strategy and conducted a wide range of business restructuring activities. They introduced 
advanced technology and the financial skilled possessed by foreign investors and 
provided their well-focused customers with financial services that were produced 
complimentarily. These efforts contributed successfully to reducing the cost of their 
business operations and realizing the merit of business diversification. 
Fourthly, the coefficient on the foreign-acquired banks’ dummy is relatively large but 
not statistically significant. The results suggest that foreign majority ownership is not 
clearly associated with change in total costs. Foreign-acquired banks have brought about 
efficient banking techniques and practices, which resulted in greater cost efficiency.  
The growth in advanced technologies such as internet-banking, phone-banking 
services will gradually decrease the need of bank staffs as well as costly full-services 
branch network. This would result in the reduction in operating costs for those foreign-
acquired banks. On the other hand, similar to Thai domestic banks, foreign-acquired 
banks modernized their management style and adopted a more stringent credit 
examination system, both of which expanded their operational cost, at least in the short-
run.  The result of estimation reflects the contrary effects of these two factors. 
As some may argue, a higher cost associated with an increase of foreign ownership 
from our results may not reflect the cost efficiency of foreign banks’ entry. Instead, it 
reflects debt burden and restructuring expenses foreign banks have to be responsible for 
after buying troubled domestic banks. 
However, Thai authorities have issued several measures to solve with the bad debt 
problems in order to attract the new foreign shareholders. Nonperforming loans (NPLs) 
from those banks are transferred to AMCs (Asset Management Companies) established 
by the government to manage bad debt. In addition, those banks are required to write 
down their capital to reduce its accumulated losses and then increase capital to sell to 
new investors. In the case of Nakornthon Bank, the state-owned Financial Institutions 
Development Fund (FIDF) agrees to compensate for lost revenue and potential losses due 
to increase in NPL to NTB for five years (Montreevat, 1999). Accordingly, balance 
sheets’ conditions of domestic banks at the time of being bought by foreign banks are 
supposed to be not very problematic. New foreign shareholders do not appear to face a 
  18high burden of restructuring costs. Thus, higher costs after the entry of foreign 
shareholders should be able to reflect the real operating efficiency for each bank. 
Finally, we include an interaction term of restructuring activities dummy (RESTRA) 
and joint-venture bank dummy variable to capture the effect of restructuring for banks 
with high foreign ownership. We observed that the estimated parameter of the 
restructuring activities dummy was negative and statistically significant. The results 
imply that the increased foreign ownership spurred the managers of banks to apply 
greater effort into achieving operating efficiency, such as integrating duplicate branches 
and laying off redundant labor in the aftermath of the crisis. On the other hand, we do not 
find any statistically significant effects of financial restructuring for other domestic 
banks
19. Compared to those banks mainly acquired by foreign banks, domestic banks 
appear to place little importance on their restructuring processes. 
The regression estimates of the cost function including interest income as a single 
output are shown in the second column of Table 3. Basically, the results are similar to 
those obtained from the first column of Table 3. They are generally satisfactory in the 
sense that the value of adjusted R-squared is high and the signs of major explanatory 




6. Robustness of Estimation 
 
There are different methods of measuring the output of banking activities. In many 
previous studies in this field, physical terms such as the outstanding amounts of loans or 
the number of loans extended have been used as proxy to the outputs of banks. In this 
section, in order to check the robustness of our findings in the previous section and 
examine the cost performance of banks from a different perspective, we estimate the cost 
function using different proxy variables to the outputs of banks
20. 
Data on the detailed compositions of assets held by individual banks are available for 
Thai domestic banks and hybrid banks, but not for foreign bank branches. Therefore, by 
using the total amount of loans as the output of banks, we estimate the cost functions in 
the following two ways. First, focusing on the loan business, we estimate the banks’ cost 
function with a single output that is measured in terms of the total amount of loans. Then, 
paying attention to both the loan business and the fee-based business, we estimate the 
cost function with two outputs that are measured in terms of the total amount of loans and 
non-interest income respectively. In both estimations, similar to the previous section, 
following the intermediation approach, we use raised funds, labor, and physical capital as 
the inputs of banks. 
Table 4 presents the regression estimates of cost function with the total amount of 
loans and non-interest income as two outputs of banks. Most of the coefficient estimators 
are statistically significant and satisfy the theoretically expected signs. The adjusted R-
squared of the estimated equation is reasonably high, indicating that the estimated 
                                                 
19 The results are not shown in the table. 
20 This approach is somewhat problematic. First, they implicitly neglect the difference in the quality of 
loans. Second, according to this approach, the amount of fee-based business operations that have increasing 
importance in today’s banking industry cannot be measured. 
  19equation fitted the data reasonably well. Although the estimated coefficient of non-
interest income, i.e., the proxy variable representing the outputs of fee-based business, is 
not statistically significant, the estimation results presented in Table 4 share similarities 
with those presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 4 Alternative Estimations 
 
First, similar to the estimates presented in Table 3, we found that the coefficients of 
the interaction term between the foreign bank branch dummy DF and the prices of inputs 
were negative for labor and physical capital, but positive for funds. This indicates that the 
production cost of foreign banks’ branches is more elastic to the change in wages P2 and 
rental rates P3, but less elastic to the change in borrowing interest rate P1 than the 
production cost of Thai domestic banks. These findings confirm that skilled labor and 
capital equipment are used more intensively in the production process of foreign bank 
branches, while funds are more intensively used in the production process of domestic 
and hybrid banks. 
Similar to the estimates presented in Table 3, the coefficient of DF is not statistically 
significant and, in addition, DF lnY1t and DF lnY2t are not statistically significant. These 
indicate that there is no significant difference in cost performance regarding either the 
fixed costs of operations or the fee-based business between domestic banks and foreign 
banks. Both in foreign bank branches and in Thai domestic banks, economies of scale 
were observed, but no economies of scope were observed. 
Second, regarding the effects of financial reform policies on the cost performance of 
Thai domestic banks and foreign bank branches, the estimation yields similar results to 
those presented in Table 3. The coefficient of the financial reform policy dummy was 
significantly positive in Thai domestic banks. On the other hand, the estimated parameter 
of the financial reform policy dummy for foreign bank branches was negative but not 
statistically significant. These observations confirm that the effects of financial reforms 
on Thai domestic banks differed from those on foreign bank branches. 
Third, the observations regarding the foreign-acquired banks are basically similar to 
those presented in Table 3. We found positive signs for the coefficients of the interaction 
term between the foreign-acquired bank dummy DH and the prices of labor and physical 
capital  P2  and  P3. These findings indicate the resemblance in the cost performance 
between hybrid banks to foreign bank branches, which suggests that the business 
operations of foreign-acquired banks were drastically restructured after their foreign 
acquisition. 
The regression estimates of the cost function including the amount of total loans as a 
single output are presented in the second column of Table 4. The estimation results do 
not considerably change from the results in the first column of Table 4. The value of 
adjusted R-squared is high. The major explanatory variables are statistically significant 
and follow the expected signs. 
The estimated results in Table 4 are basically similar to those presented in Table 3. 
Therefore, the characteristics of different types of banks and the effects of the financial 
reform policy that were observed in the previous section are sufficiently robust to derive 
the following conclusions. 
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7. Conclusions: Summary and Policy Implications 
 
Following the 1997 financial crisis, foreign bank penetration increased substantially 
in Thailand. This is expected to be a significant catalyst for change in the domestic 
banking industry and to improve the productivity of the Thai banking sector. To 
understand the impact of foreign penetration and formulate the most appropriate policies 
to ensure that foreign banks operate in line with the long-term goals of Thai banking, it is 
essential to investigate the differences in production technology between foreign and 
Thai domestic banks and the extent to which these have changed given increasing foreign 
penetration in recent years. 
This paper is the first formal attempt to investigate precisely the comparative cost 
structure of foreign and Thai domestic banks in relation to the overall process of foreign 
bank penetration, which began in the early 1990s. This paper estimates the cost functions 
of foreign and Thai domestic banks by using panel data from 27 commercial banks in 
Thailand from 1990 to 2002. The production technologies and cost characteristics of the 
foreign and Thai domestic banks are compared, the impact of increased foreign 
participation on their cost performance is evaluated, and the sources of operational 
advantages of foreign and domestic banks are identified. Then, based on the 
technological characteristics of the banks identified, we discuss the appropriateness of 
foreign bank entry policy in Thailand as well as the implications for future banking 
policies. 
The results of our empirical analysis provide the following evidence that the recent 
Thai financial reform policies, particularly allowing greater foreign bank penetration, are 
on the right track to building a desirable banking industry structure. 
First, according to our empirical analysis, the production technologies for foreign 
bank branches are distinct from those of Thai domestic banks. Foreign bank branches 
provide services that are human capital intensive and physical capital intensive, while 
domestic banks provide services that are fund intensive. These performance 
characteristics of foreign bank branches reflect that they maintain highly skilled workers 
and invest in advanced technology, limit their credit exposure, and mostly focus on 
advanced services in investment banking and private banking. On the other hand, Thai 
domestic banks focus on fund-based business, i.e., traditional retail banking services 
centering on taking deposits and extending loans. 
This suggests that foreign bank branches and their Thai rivals can share their 
specialized market roles for the highest cost efficiency. Foreign bank branches have the 
advantage in the wholesale market centering on multinational corporations and large Thai 
corporations that need highly sophisticated financial services based on international 
platforms, while Thai domestic banks have the advantage in the retail market where basic 
banking services are provided to ordinary Thai corporations and households. Appropriate 
role sharing between foreign bank branches and other banks should be determined by 
their respective competitive advantages. 
Second, the estimated results show that the financial reform policies adopted after the 
Asian crisis pushed up the operational costs of Thai domestic banks whereas they pushed 
down the operational costs of foreign bank branches. This suggests that strengthening 
prudential regulations and upgrading monitoring systems significantly increases the cost 
  21of the credit risk management that is inevitable for modernization of the Thai domestic 
banks. A rise in operational cost of Thai domestic banks reflects their stricter monitoring 
and supervision processes, which results in better-quality loans. This is a good sign for 
improvement in lending practices in the Thai banking market. 
On the other hand, the modernization of business practices and improvement of 
financial regulations and corporate laws after the Asian financial crisis substantially 
lessened the disadvantage of foreign bank branches in information correction and credit 
risk examination in Thai banking market. This enabled foreign bank branches to make 
full use of their advanced skills and technology in providing financial services. As a 
result, the operational costs of foreign bank branches were reduced after the financial 
reform policies were adopted. 
Third, our empirical study shows that the joint venture banks changed their cost 
performance drastically in the few years after they were acquired by foreign investors. 
These joint venture banks had operational characteristics similar to those of foreign bank 
branches, reflecting their intensive efforts in business restructuring and modernization 
investment. Foreign investors have brought efficient banking techniques, such as the 
introduction of advanced techniques in loan portfolio management, ALM (Asset Liability 
Management), and management information services. Foreign investors have also 
adopted a rational system for recruitment, promotion, and training. These factors 
contribute to avoid a rise in the operational cost of foreign-acquired banks. In addition, as 
foreign partners apply effort into fee-based services, we expect improvement in operating 
efficiencies in these areas of business. In general, we found that foreign majority 
acquisition of Thai domestic banks is likely to improve the functioning of the domestic 
banking market, which ultimately results in positive welfare implications for their 
customers. Accordingly, the impact of increased foreign participation has evidently been 
positive. 
Finally, according to the estimation results, there are economies of scale in Thai 
domestic banks, foreign-acquired banks, and foreign bank branches, meaning that 
enlarging the operational size of banks helps improve cost efficiency. Following the crisis, 
there has been an increase in fixed costs for domestic banks and foreign-acquired banks 
owing to large investments in advanced technology. This implies that the banks, 
particularly small foreign-acquired banks, should increase their scale to reduce the 
average cost of new investments. These observations support the current financial reform 
policy that scale expansion from the merger and acquisition process is important for the 
improvement in operational efficiency and should be encouraged further
21. Foreign bank 
entry should be encouraged under the condition that domestic banks are able to prepare 
themselves for the new competitive market environment. 
                                                 
21 On July 2004, United Oversea Bank (UOB) bought the majority shares of Bank of Asia from ABN 
AMRO. UOB is to merge UOB Radanasin with Bank of Asia under the  Financial Sector Master Plan 
issued by the Bank of Thailand. It has said that financial institutions operating in Thailand should have  
“one presence” which would mean that UOB would merge its two entities into one.  
 
  22On the other hand, economies of scope were evident only in hybrid banks, whereas 
they were not observed in either Thai domestic banks or foreign bank branches. Foreign-
acquired banks succeeded in providing the complimentary financial services demanded 
by their relatively small but well focused customer base. Following the example of the 
business practices of foreign-acquired banks, both Thai domestic banks and foreign bank 
branches should make additional efforts to improve cost efficiency and realize the 
economies of scope that are to emerge through efficient banking operations. 
  23     Appendix 
Table A1. List of Commercial Banks 
 
 
Domestic Banks (including hybrid banks) 
 
1.  BOA = Bank of Asia (ABN AMRO) 
2.  BAY = Bank of Ayudhya 
3.  BBL = Bangkok Bank 
4.  BBC = The Bangkok Bank of Commerce 
5.  BMB = Bangkok Metropolitan Bank 
6.  BT = BankThai 
7.  DTDB = The DBS Thai Danu Bank 
8.  FBCB = First Bangkok City Bank 
9.  KTB = Krung Thai Bank 
10. LTB = The Laem Thong Bank 
11. SCB = The Siam Commercial Bank 
12. SCIB = The Siam City Bank 
13. SCNB = Standard Chartered Nakornthon Bank 
14. TFB = Thai Farmers Bank (Kasikornbank) 
15. TMB = The Thai Military Bank 
16. UB = The Union Bank of Bangkok 
17. UOBR = UOB Radanasin Bank 
 
 
Pure Foreign Banks (i.e. foreign bank branches) 
 
1.  STANDARD = Standard Chartered Bank 
2.  HSBC = The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 
3.  OVERSEA = Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation 
4.  BOA = Bank of America 
5.  BANQUE INDOSUEZ = Credit Agricole Indosuez 
6.  CHASE = JP Morgan Chase Bank 
7.  CITI = Citibank 
8.  DEUTSCHE = Deutsche Bank 
9.  BHARAT = Bharat Overseas Bank 
10. CHINA = The Bank of China 
11. ABN = ABN AMRO Bank 
 
 
  24Table A2. Results of EstimationAdministrator 
Parameter Estimated  value  t-value  p-value 
α0  3.958 2.994 [.003]
α1  0.643 4.779 [.000]
α2  0.221 1.863 [.062]
β1  0.837 93.309 [.000]
β2  0.113 15.656 [.000]
β3  0.050 22.059 [.000]
ζ  6.861 1.574 [.116]
ζY1
  0.001 0.002 [998]
ζY2  –0.357 1.743 [.081]
ζP1  –0.138 –5.577 [.000]
ζP2  0.083 4.151 [.000]
ζP
φ 
3  1.056 119.774 [.000]
–1.299 –0.767 [.443]
φY1  –0.086 –0.549 [.583]
φY2  0.084 0.638 [.523]
φP1  –0.092 –6.992 [.000]
φP2  0.086 8.199 [.000]
φP3  1.005 248.767 [.000]
ηPOLICY
  1.506 6.186 [.000]
φPOLICY  –0.592 –3.657 [.000]
Adjusted R-square  0.893    
Number of observations  256    
  Estimated value  Wald statistics  p-value 
Domestic banks      
Economies of scale  0.864 35.014 [.000]
Economies of scope  0.142 22.162 [.000]
Foreign bank branches      
Economies of scale  0.862 3.561 [.059]
Economies of scope  0.170 39.748 [.000]
Foreign-acquired banks      
Economies of scale  0.508 24.279 [.007]
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  28Table 1. Evolution of Foreign Participation for Domestic Banks ( as the Percentage 
of foreign-owned shares to total shares) 
 
  Before the Crisis (1992-1996) After the Crisis (1999-2002) 
BAY 10.50  9.48 
BB 13.18  31.78 
BBC 11.52  - 
BMB 9.75  0.00 
BT -  0.50 
FBCB 16.03  - 
KTB 7.45  0.60 
LTB 1.67  - 
SCB 15.02  27.93 
SCIB 11.96  - 
TFB 15.30  28.75 
TMB 16.14  2.45 
UB 18.27  - 
BOA 5.06  77.90  (Joint-Venture) 
DTDB 7.43  56.85  (Joint-Venture) 
SCNB 5.56  75.00  (Joint-Venture) 
UOBR 1.67  75.00  (Joint-Venture) 
 
(Source) The I-SIMS database of the Stock Exchange of Thailand. 
(Notes) 1. BOA = Bank of Asia (ABN-AMRO), BAY = Bank of Ayudhya, BBL = Bangkok Bank, 
BBC = The Bangkok Bank of Commerce, BMB = Bangkok Metropolitan Bank, BT = BankThai, 
DTDB = The DBS Thai Danu Bank, FBCB = First Bangkok City Bank, KTB = Krung Thai Bank, 
LTB = The Laem Thong Bank, SCB = The Siam Commercial Bank, SCIB = The Siam City Bank, 
SCNB = Standard Chartered Nakornthon Bank, TFB = Thai Farmers Bank (Kasikornbank), TMB = 
The Thai Military Bank, UB = The Union Bank of Bangkok, UOBR = UOB Radanasin Bank. 
         2. 
–Bangkok Bank of Commerce (BBC) was turned into a nonbank, Asset Management Companies 
(AMCs), owned by the Financial Institutions development Fund (FIDF) 
–Bangkok Metropolitan Bank (BMB) and Siam City Bank (SCIB) were recapitalized according to 
end-2000 LCP rules by the government. 
–BankThai Public Company Limited was established in 1998 as a state-run commercial bank, with 
the Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF) as the largest shareholder (48.98%). 
–First Bangkok City Bank (FBCB) was integrated with Krung Thai Bank (KTB) in August 1998. 
–During the same period, The Union Bank of Bangkok (UB) and the 12 finance companies were 
consolidated with Krung Thai Thanakit (KTT). 
–Laem Thong Bank (LTB) was merged with Radanasin Bank (RAB), a new bank established in 
March 1998 with the purpose of purchasing and managing assets of financial institutions. Then, it 
was sold to the Singapore-based United Oversea Bank (UOB) and changed its name to UOB 
Radanasin (UOBR), a new bank established with the purpose of purchasing and managing assets 
of financial institutions. 
–Four commercial banks are majority-owned by foreign investors. DBS Thai Danu Bank (DTDB) 
was acquired by Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) in January 1998, Bank of Asia (BOA) 
was acquired by ABN AMRO Bank in June 1998, Standard Chartered Nakornthon Bank (SCNB) 
was acquired by Standard Chartered Bank in September 1999, and UOB Radanasin Bank (UOBR) 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3. Results of Estimation 
 
Parameter  Two products  Single product 
 Estimated 
value 
t-value p-value Estimated 
value 
t-value  p-value
α0  4.044 3.045 [.002] 3.404 2.547  [.011]
α1  0.633 4.665 [.000] 0.873 15.277  [.000]
α2  0.228 1.902 [.057] – – –
β1  0.837 96.074 [.000] 0.837 97.120  [.000]
β2  0.113 15.964 [.000] 0.112 16.103  [.000]
β3  0.050 22.057 [.000] 0.050 22.088  [.000]
ζ  3.614 0.539 [.590] 7.985 1.303  [.193] 
ζY1
  0.375 0.713 [476] –0.350 –1.378  [.211]
ζY2  –0.560 0713 [.079] – – –
ζP1  –0.149 –5.022 [.000] –0.149 –5.042  [.000]
ζP2  0.087 3.637 [.000] 0.087 3.642  [.000]
ζP
φ 
3  1.062 149.725 [.000] 1.062 150.275  [.000]
–1.449 –0.852 [.394] –2.459 –1.426  [.154]
φY1  –0.069 –0.437 [.662] 0.059 0.578  [.449]
φY2  0.073 0.547 [.585] – – –
φP1  –0.092 –7.235 [.000] –0.092 –7.272  [.000]
φP2  0.087 8.391 [.000] 0.086 8.396  [.000]
φP3  1.006 248.809 [.000] 1.006 252.861  [.000]
ηPOLICY
  1.566 6.079 [.000] 1.432 6.069  [.000]
φPOLICY
ζ
  –0.591 –3.636 [.000] –0.714 –4.408  [.000]
RESTR  –0.472 –1.799 [.072] –0.295 –1.286 [.199]
Adjusted R-square  0.894 0.889    
Number of observations  249 253   












Domestic banks   
Economies of scale  0.861 34.349 [.000] 0.873 26.638  [.000]
Economies of scope  0.144 24.055 [.000] – –  –
Foreign bank branches   
Economies of scale  0.864 3.543 [.069] 0.932 0.688  [.406]
Economies of scope  0.169 38.960 [.000] – –  –
Foreign-acquired banks   
Economies of scale  0.676 7.219 [.007] 0.522 7.926  [.005]
Economies of scope  –0.335 2.884 [.089] – –  –
  31  32
Table 4. Alternative Results of Estimation 
 
Parameter  Two products  Single product 
 Estimated 
value 
t-value p-value Estimated 
value 
t-value  p-value
α0  0.710 0.159 [.646] 5.741 4.703  [.000]
α1  0.839 6.194 [.000] 0.775 15.013  [.000]
α2  0.088 0.766 [.444] – – –
β1  0.837 93.133 [.000] 0.837 97.068  [.000]
β2  0.113 15.955 [.000] 0.113 16.148  [.000]
β3  0.050 22.056 [.000] 0.050 22.108  [.000]
ζ  16.682 4.266 [.000] 5.580 1.396  [.163] 
ζY1
  –0.509 1.547 [.122] –0.221 –1.378  [.168]
ζY2  –0.200 –0.633 [.527] – – –
ζP1  –0.092 –7.257 [.000] –0.149 –5.042  [.000]
ζP2  0.087 3.623 [.000] 0.087 3.642  [.000]
ζP
φ 
3  1.062 149.155 [.000] 1.062 150.336  [.000]
–2.640 –1.301 [.193] –8.137 –4.499  [.000]
φY1  –0.010 –0.060 [.952] 0.293 3.891  [.000]
φY2  0.059 0.458 [.647] – – –
φP1  –0.092 –7.257 [.000] –0.090 –7.170  [.000]
φP2  0.087 8.409 [.000] 0.085 8.293  [.000]
φP3  1.006 249.705 [.000] 1.006 252.521  [.000]
ηPOLICY
  0.806 3.731 [.000] 1.442 6.296  [.000]
φPOLICY
ζ
  –0.212 –1.450 [.147] –0.772 –5.019  [.000]
RESTR  –0.233 –1.049 [.294] –0.339 –1.502 [.133]
Adjusted R-square  0.906 0.891    
Number of observations  249 253   










Domestic banks   
Economies of scale  0.927 18.832 0.000 0.775 19.243  [.000]
Economies of scope  0.074 6.499 0.011 – –  –
Foreign bank branches   
Economies of scale  0.997 0.002 0.968 1.069 0.873  [.350]
Economies of scope  0.125 6.249 0.012 – –  –
Foreign-acquired banks   
Economies of scale  0.218 67.953 0.000 0.554 26.426  [.000]
Economies of scope  –0.037 0.211 0.646 – –  –
 